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Abstract
We present Knowledge Of Action Networks, which provide an enactive machine learning model
for knowledge of agency in artiﬁcial intelligence. These networks, which are expected to be
part of embodied intelligences existing in dynamic environments, learn to represent their envi-
ronment while simultaneously learning to represent their own actions and bodies within that
environment. Thus self and world are intricately coupled in their basic representations. We
will also explore some of the (many) expected contributions of such networks for implementing
minimal self-models, which are basic models of self-aware agents.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we will present a machine learning model that allows an artiﬁcial agent to develop a
knowledge of agency based on its actions and sensory feedback from its environment. Knowledge
of agency refers to an agent’s knowledge that it is undergoing a particular action. This is
generally called sense of agency [3] in the literature, but we prefer to use the term knowledge
to avoid any implication that our implementation will have any qualitative feeling associated
with it. Crucially, the knowledge that we will describe will be immediate in the sense of
being unmediated (or at least minimally mediated), grounded in that it interacts dynamically
with the “real” world (rather than being an abstract symbol), situated in that it functions as a
representation of agency at a particular time and in a particular environment, and open in that
it can dynamically alter in new situations (while representing the same thing.) These properties
will each be discussed more fully in a later section. I see the current work as grounding many
(but not all) uses of the indexical “I”; future work will integrate this into a broader model of a
minimal self.
A minimal self is perhaps most simply understood as a minimal model of of an agent’s
subjectivity; see [8] and [12] for two diﬀerent but overlapping approaches to this idea. In
[2] it was argued that an account of subjectivity is a fundamental notion in need of a good
computational model and that such a model will enable progress on a number of diﬃcult
questions in cognitive science. While there is no consensual set of necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for a minimal self-model, the broader program is predicated on endowing a model
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with a knowledge of agency, knowledge of ownership, situatedness, temporal awareness and self-
reference. I will argue that all but the last two are achieved (at least partially) by the current
work; the ﬁnal properties will be explored in future work.
The network presented here, termed a KOAN (Knowledge Of Agency Network) develops
a representation of its agency by learning to predict the sensory consequences of its actions.
In particular, the network will represent its environment in a hierarchical way and while it’s
learning that representation will try to predict the output of one high-level feature based on
the current sensory information and the action it is about to undertake. Since the prediction
and representation are learned simultaneously, the result of this will be that the high level
feature learned will have to represent a kind of sensory locus of action. For example, if an
agent is capable of moving its body in several discrete directions, then this learning paradigm
will force the representation to be a representation of the body in a way that covaries with the
appropriate actions.
The model is enactive (see, e.g., [6]) in the sense that the prediction forms a simultaneous
representation of self and action. Indeed, while the self is modeled in the sensory data it is
modeled inherently as an actor rather than a thing. Although the action is modeled with an
explicit representation, it will ultimately be represented as a dynamic interaction between self
and environment.
In a review article [5], Limanowski and Blakenburg argued for using predictive coding as a
way of obtaining an enactive minimal self-model. While the language we use here is diﬀerent,
the current model should translate well into the vocabulary of predictive coding; thus the
machine learning model described here can be thought of as providing an implementation of
the kind of enactive self-model they describe.
I will present the machine-learning model in the next section and follow this by a discussion of
its properties and some of the potential technologies I see arising from it (many of these ideas are
present in [5], but with a speciﬁc model at hand we can give somewhat more implementational
detail).
The work in this paper is a piece of a larger program of implementing a minimal self-model
in collaboration with Donald Perlis and his research group at the University of Maryland. In
particular, the importance of the initial concepts discussed in Section 3 was pointed out to
me by Perlis and many of the other ideas in this paper either directly arose from or else were
inspired by conversations with him.
2 The Model
In this section I will deﬁne a KOAN as a general scheme that relies on an environmental
encoding module and a self-action prediction module. Given an agent situated in a changing
environment, we will denote the totality of its sensory input at time t by St (conceived as a
vector in some high-dimensional Euclidean space). If an agent has a ﬁxed (and ﬁnite) set of
possible actions it can take, say α1, . . . , αn, then we will denote the action that it does take at
time t by at. Our basic approach is to learn a high level representation of the environment and
force that representation to pick out the eﬀects of the agent’s actions.
To that end we will deﬁne a KOAN as consisting of two modules: a hierarchical representa-
tional network H (for example a deep convolutional network) and a predictive network P (e.g.
a multi-layer perceptron). The network H functions to represent the environment at a given
time while P functions to make predictions about a part that representation based on the cur-
rent environment and the action taken. In order for P to successfully make such a prediction,
the part of the representation in question must covary with the action, forcing the network to
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Figure 1: The KOAN Model
represent its own “embodiment” in its environment. That is, the network must have an explicit
representation of the parts of its environment that change predictably with each speciﬁc action,
which in suﬃciently complex environments should correspond to the body.
Speciﬁcally, let us assume thatH is a hierarchical model that at time t extracts basic features
from St and then extract features of those features, and so on iteratively. Formally, we assume
that H transforms St into a sequence of representations S0t (= St), S1t , . . . Smt where each Si+1t
is a set of features {Si+1,1t , . . . , Si+1,lit } that can be used to describe the features of Sit . For
example, in a convolutional network the features of S1t might represent the result of detecting
various kinds of edges in the input image while S2t might then represent combinations of those
edges, etc. Ideally of such a representation might correspond to our own higher level concepts
about a sensory input (for example, we might detect “person” based on detecting various shapes
in a particular conﬁguration, while those shapes are based on detecting various types of edges
and shadings, etc.) Let us denote the ﬁrst feature at the highest level of the hierarchy by σt
(thus σt := S
m,1
t ); then our goal will be for σt become a representation of the agent itself in the
environment. 1
This will be accomplished by using the network P. We will assume that P takes as input
at time t the vector St along with a vector-representation of the action at. It will then output
a vector πt which will be its prediction of what σt+1 will be.
To train our model, we will assume that H computes the representations on the basis of
learnable parameters (at time t) θt and that learning proceeds by minimizing a loss function
LH(St; θt). If our predictive network is parameterized by ψ, then we will deﬁne a new loss func-
tion LP(StSt+1;ψtθt+1) that measures the predictive error as some kind of diﬀerence between
πt and σt+1. The total loss at time t+ 1 would then be the sum of these:
Lt+1 = LH(St; θt) + LP(StSt+1;ψtθt) (1)
1An interesting alternative representation would be to attempt a prediction of σt+1 based only on σtat
(rather than using all of St; the disadvantage here is that one would not be able to account for context-
dependent consequence of actions (e.g. bouncing right when moving left). The advantage would be that using
the whole environment may make incorporate too much in the represented self. In some ways this may be good,
since there is experimental evidence from Haggard (discussed later) that agency can be attributed to surprising
parts of the environment.
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The simplest choice for LP might be the mean-squared error, so that equation (1) becomes
Lt+1 = LH(St; θt) + η‖σt+1 − πt‖2 (2)
where η is a meta-parameter that controls the balance between trying to learn good features
of the environment and trying to make good predictions. It is worth noting that a priori
this function runs the risk of having both πt and σt+1 be constant, but that since this should
eﬀectively decrease the value of σt+1 as a high level feature of H, this shouldn’t happen in
practice.
Currently experimentation is using stochastic gradient descent to minimize this loss; given
reasonably well-behaved choices of LP and LH faster convergence should be possible.
3 Network Properties and Potential Capabilities
One of the main purposes of this network is to provide for a grounded representation of the self.
If we view the network as representing itself and its action, then this network has a number
of desirable properties that would seem to match our human self-representations which are not
present in classical logic-based agents.
In the ﬁrst place, the self-representation of a KOAN is immediate. There is a long history
in the phenomological philosophical tradition (see, e.g. [13]) of noting that self-awareness
is pre-reﬂective. That is, our knowledge of our selves does not come about after some of
conceptual/deductive reﬂection – it is rather given immediately to experience 2. In the same
way, once a self-representation has been learned, the self-representation in the highest level of
H will be immediately given at any moment – it arises from the structure of the network rather
than from doing additional computations on the input3.
In a similar way, our self-representation is grounded. I mean by this that the network’s
representation of itself is not just an abstract symbol, but is based on real experiences of itself
and tied in an explictly causal manner to its own actions. Thus it avoids the philosphical
(and practical) diﬃculties posed by the symbol grounding problem [11]. Further, Don Perlis
has argued that a good grounded self-symbol can potentially serve as an anchor for grounding
meanings more generally [7].
Finally, such a symbol is situated and open. The representation of an action in the hier-
archical network will not be a ﬁxed entity, but will rather be instantiated by a diﬀerent value
for the feature in each given situation, and potentially in new situations as well. This is true
even while the fact that the contents of the feature are a self-representation remains constant.
Thus we have a constant symbol (sense) with a kind of shifting reference. In particular, this
formulation shows a path toward allowing for the indexical “I” in artiﬁcial systems. This is a
diﬃcult problem (if not impossible) for systems that do not use situated symbols, as described
eloquently in the work of John Perry [9, 10].
I also contend that a KOAN can provide support for a number of cognitively important
capabilities, many of them tied to other properties of a minimal self-model. It is worth noting
that while I believe a KOAN is an eﬀective implementation of the predictive coding framework
2This description is usually in the context of self-awareness conceived as consciousness rather than bodily-self
awareness. In embodied traditions, where the body is an integral part of such awareness, a bodily-self awarenss
would arguably be a crucial component of such self-awareness.
3While one could argue that passing the sensory input forward through the network is itself a kind of extra
computation, it seems reasonable to assume that any perceptual system with a hierarchical representations
would have all levels of such representation present at any given moment as a “baseline” for computation.
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for a sense of agency described by Limanowski and Blakenburg, I do not believe that the latter
by itself entails a minimal self-model. In particular, in [2], Don Perlis, Michael Cox and I
argued that such a model will necessarily have an immediate access to its own processing (as
self-awareness) in real-time.
Capabilities that the KOAN model seems likely to provide for include a knowledge of own-
ership associated with bodily selves, the capability for multimodal integration (as discussed in
[5]), a ﬂuid sense of agency described in P. Haggard’s experimental work [4], the learning of
aﬀordances, corollary discharge and real-time error detection and correction.
Knowledge 4 of ownership refers to an agent’s awareness of its body as its own. There are
some subtleties involved in what constitutes ownership, but a reasonable ﬁrst stipulation might
be that whatever an agent controls is “owned” by that agent. Thus all moveable body parts
would be considered owned by an agent, as would its voice and tactile sensation. Some thought
reveals control may be suﬃcient for ownership but is not necessary, since if it were I would not
own my thoughts or autonomic nervous system. There does, however, seem to be some kind of
relation between such phenomena and those that are controlled by me (my autonomic nervous
system is contained in the body that I move volitionally; my thoughts may not be completely
volitional but are at least partially so.) It thus seems plausible that knowledge of ownership
can be grounded in the kind of knowledge of agency described here. In particular, a KOAN
can pick out what the parts of the environment under its control by simply looking at a kind of
inverse image of σt. That is, once an eﬀective representation of self is established we can take
those parts of St that are represented in σt as being controlled by the agent.
Multimodal integration refers to the fact that agency is not usually experienced in a single
modality but across modalities. For example, my sense of pressing the keys on my keyboard
draws on the visual feedback of my ﬁngers moving the keys, the tactile and proprioceptive
feelings of pressing the keys and the sounds that the keyboard makes as I interact with it. These
do not give rise to three separate agencies, but rather to a single uniﬁed sense of agency that
draws on all of these sensory modalities as contributions. Representing agency multimodally is
straightforward in our model – we simply let St denote the totality of sensory input from all
modalities. Such a representation gives rise to a number of interesting questions.
One immediate question is the role of various modalities in contributing to agency. For
example, if I close my eyes and continue to type I still derive a sense of agency from the
sensory input I receive from other modalities. It is an empirical question whether this sense of
agency is any way weaker than it would be with all senses engaged or if diﬀerent modalities
contribute diﬀerently. More generally one might ask whether a sense of agency is a binary or
graded phenomenon. It is similarly an empirical question of how a trained KOAN model would
respond to this question; presumably if its training disagreed with the empirical evidence about
humans, the model parameters could be modiﬁed to agree with human behavior.
Another interesting avenue of investigation would be to examine the role of certain kinds of
prior knowledge in agency and see how they could be implemented in a KOAN. For example,
it seems plausible that a lack of visual input will have a smaller eﬀect on my sense of agency if
I know that my vision is impaired (and can thus amplify other modalities) than if I don’t.
In a somewhat similar vein, we note experiments of Patrick Haggard in which subjects
learned a sense of agency from pressing a button with their right hands while simultaneously
having their left hands moved involuntarily by a machine [4]. Haggard found that these subjects
also developed a sense of agency associated solely with the involuntary motion. Such a derived
sense of agency would naturally be modelled by our networks. Indeed, since our predictive
network looks for statistical regularities (rather than, e.g. causal connections) this will be their
4As before, the literature refers to this as a sense of ownership.
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default behavior. As such they model ( and perhaps hint at an explanation for ) an interesting
phenomenon in human psychology.
Further, these networks may allow for the natural learning of aﬀordances. Indeed, I hy-
pothesize (and am in the process of testing empirically) that an agent which is forced to learn
a representation of itself will naturally be pushed to learning meaningful representations of its
environment. In particular, an agent with a robust self-representation should more easily learn
representations for diﬀerent ways an action can eﬀect an environment and representation for
what parts of an environment can eﬀect it.
Another use of these networks would be to subtract the expected sensory output of an action
from the received sensory input. This mechanism is known as corollary discharge in humans,
and is thought to be the mechanism at play in the phenomenon of one’s being unable to tickle
oneself [1] – the tactile input from your own touch is subtracted (at least partially) from the
total tactile input so that self-touch is not felt as strongly.
Finally, we can use these networks to perform real-time error detection and correction (as is
done with “visual servoing” in robotics). Here the expected sensory feedback can be compared
with the received feedback, and corrective action can be taken if they don’t match. For example,
if an agent intended to move its arm ﬁve centimeters to the right but found that it only moved
three centimeters, it can continue its motion for longer, continue it with more force, or else try
to engage in some reasoning to determine what’s going on and what an appropriate corrective
would be.
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